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Blackburn: Identity Protection for Sexual Assault Victims: Exploring Alterna

IDENTITY PROTECTION FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT

VICTIMS: EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES
TO THE PUBLICATION
OF PRIVATE FACTS TORT
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Doe 2 v. Associated Press,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit gave terse treatment to a sexual assault victim's publication of private
facts tort claim.2 The plaintiff, who remained anonymous to the public throughout
the criminal trial and conviction of his molester, chose to give a victim's impact
statement in open court. He revealed his identity after the judge allegedly ordered
4
reporters not to reveal the individual's name.3 All reporters acquiesced except one.
The victim's name was published.5 Upon review of the district court's dismissal of
the victim's civil action against the Associated Press, the court of appeals failed to
explore the constitutional concerns associated with "wrongful publicizing of private
7
affairs" claims.6 Instead, the Doe 2 court applied South Carolina law. The court
rejected the "wrongful publicizing of private affairs" claim, as well as intrusion,
8
infliction of emotional distress, and fraudulent misrepresentation claims. South
Carolina's privacy law appears to be well established. If the law is so well
established, what altematives exist for victims of sexual abuse who wish not to be
exposed in such a fashion?
Based on the large volume of works discussing the right to privacy, legal
9
academia has repeatedly bid welcome and adieu to the invasion of privacy tort
1. 331 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2003).
2. Id. at 421-22.

3. Id. at 419. The existence of this order was disputed. For purposes of evaluating the legal questions, the court assumed the plaintiffs allegations were true. Id.
4. Id. at 420.
5. Id.
6. Doe 2 v. Associated Press, 331 F.3d 417, 421-22 (4th Cir. 2003).
7. Id. at 421-22.
8. Id. at 420-22.
9. See generallyJohn A. Jurata, Jr., Comment, The Tort that Refuses to Go Away: The Subtle
Reemergence of Public Disclosure of Private Facts, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489, 510-24 (1999)
(surveying recent cases in which public disclosure of private facts tort successfully protected
individuals' privacy and suggesting that the tort is reemerging); Jane E. Prine, Case Note, Lake v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 582 N. W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998), 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 999, 999-1000 (1999)
(highlighting a recent Minnesota case in which the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized a private
individual's right to privacy); Kim Ruckdaschel-Haley, Note, The Florida Star v. B.J.F.: Balancing
Freedom ofthe Pressand the Right to Privacyupon Publicationofa Rape Victim 's Identity, 35 S.D.
L. REV. 94, 117 (1990) (arguing that as a result of recent United States Supreme Court decisions,
effective protection ofprivate but truthful information is hard to conceptualize); Diane L. Zimmerman,
Requiemfora Heavyweight: A Farewellto Warren andBrandeis'sPrivacyTort, 68 CORNELLL. REV.
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since its inception in the often cited Warren and Brandeis article, The Right to
Privacy.'° The subject is controversial and likely has no "one size fits all" solution.
Legal options for protection from public disclosure of sexual assault victims'
identities are less accessible, despite what appeared to be a surge in recognition of
the right to privacy."1
Part II of this Comment explores the constitutional concerns involved in public
disclosure of private facts claims, including the interests of sexual assault victims,
the bases upon which states grant legal protection, and relevant United States
Supreme Court decisions. Part III uses the Doe 2 v. Associated Press decision to
examine the development and current state of privacy protection in South Carolina.
Part IV highlights and summarizes alternative approaches in privacy protection
throughout the country. Based on this analysis, Part V advances an alternative to
protect the privacy of sexual assault victims that is consistent with relevant Supreme
Court decisions, and merges the most acceptable devices in such protection.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS

A. Interests of Sexual Assault Victims
Any analysis of the constitutionality of publishing sexual assault victims' names
must begin with a brief discussion of the interests involved. The policies underlying
the privacy rights of sexual assault victims are in direct conflict with other policies,
including freedom of the press, that stand in favor of publishing the names with
impunity.
1. PoliciesAgainst Protection
One frequently offered argument for limiting protection of sexual assault
victims' identities stems from the Freedom of the Press Clause expressed in the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.'2 The major policy underlying this
clause, as well as the Free Speech Clause generally, is that there is a "large[] public
interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth"' 3 and the
workings of the government.' 4 It is an established notion that freedom of press and
speech are critical in a democratic society to ensure that the government is

291,362 (1983) (arguing that the "private-facts tort has failed to become a usable and effective means

of redress for plaintiffs").
10. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 195-96

(1890) (indicating generally that the press crosses a line when it publishes private information, and the
law should offer a remedy for abuses).
11. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,488 (1975) (White, J.) (noting that "the century
has experienced a strong tide running in favor of the so-called right of privacy").

12. See Ruckdaschel-Haley, supra note 9, at 98.
13. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964), quotedin Cox Broad.Corp., 420 U.S. at 491.
14. See Ruckdaschel-Haley, supra note 9, at 98.
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functioning at the "will of the public."' 5
Other reasons to allow publication of sexual assault victims' names are
compelling. Many have said that "protecting" the names of sexual assault victims
adds to the stigma associated with the crime.' 6 Writer James Warren describes the
protection of victims' anonymity as a "demeaning form of self-censorship."' 7
Another policy against maintaining anonymity is society's emphasis on preventing
crime through education.'" The idea is that if society's views of sexual assault are
ever to change, people must learn about the crime and the victims through
identification of the victims. 9

Additionally, ajournalist's job is to publish the facts in an objective manner.2"
Proponents of publication argue that journalists should not be forced to exclude any
facts of a story. 2' Accurately reporting the facts, including the victims' names,
"add[s] credibility to the story. '22 Proponents also argue that courts should not
make editorial decisions.23 Harry Kalven, author and former Professor of Law at
the University of Chicago, "suggest[s] 'that whatever is in the news media is by
definition newsworthy, that the press must in the nature of things be the final arbiter
the claim of privilege is not so
of newsworthiness,"' and also questions "whether
2
overpowering as virtually to swallow the tort. 1
2. Policies in Favorof Protection
Of course, one of the major policies supporting protection of sexual assault
victims' identities is the desire to protect victims from any further humiliation.2 5
Sexual assault is a highly personal crime. Frequently, victims are viewed as sharing
responsibility for their attacks. 26 Exposure to the public's scrutiny is often likened
to being assaulted a second time. Opponents of publication argue that it is not the

15. Id.
16. Deborah W. Denno, Perspectiveson DisclosingRape Victims 'Names, 61 FORDHAM L. REV.
1113, 1124 (1993) (citing Geneva Overholser, American Shame: The Stigma of Rape, DES MOINES
REGISTER, July 11, 1989, at 6A).
17. James Warren, Naming Rape Victims a Debatefor Media, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 18, 1991, § 1, at
5, quoted in id. at 1124.
18. See Denno, supra note 16, at 1125-26.

19. See id.
20. See id. at 1126.
21. See id.
22. Deborah W. Denno, Perspectiveson DisclosingRape Victims 'Names, 61 FORDHAM L. REV.
1113, 1126 (1993).
23. See id. at 1127.
24. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law--Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 336 (1966), quoted in Sheldon W. Halpern, Rethinking the Right of Privacy:
Dignity,Decency and the Law's Limitations, 43, RUTGERS L. REV. 539, 550 (1991).
25. Denno, supra note 16, at 1113, 1124.
26. See Benjamin J. Marrison, Editorial, Bryant's Alleged Victim Should Stay Nameless,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 3, 2003, at IC (stating that some still believe that the victims "somehow
brought it upon themselves").
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victims' responsibility to educate the public about sexual assault, and "change must
come from the individuals in society who hold stereotypical views about rape, not
from the victims themselves."" Additional policies supporting the protection of
victims' identities include physical protection ofthe victim from retribution or harm
by the accused,2" increasing both the reporting of crimes and the number of arrests,
and encouraging participation in court proceedings.29
A more abstract reason to protect the identity of sexual assault victims from
publication by the press is to protect the individual's sense of self.30 "What is really
at issue ... [is] the debasement of his sense of himself as a person that results

because [an individual's] life has become a public spectacle against his will."'" Dr.
Edward Bloustein, author and former President of Rutgers University, described
invasion of privacy as "a blow to human dignity."32 It is for this final reason-the
affront to one's inner sanctity that results from sexual assault-that rape victims are
entitled to protection and anonymity.
B. Typical Bases on Which States Grant Legal Protection
"[V]irtually all jurisdictions now recognize, either by common law or statute,
some form of the individual's right to exercise some degree of control over the
public use of his or her persona."" Of course, due to the competing interests
involved and privacy's intangible nature, "[t]his recognition . . . [has been]

accompanied by confusion and controversy over the nature and [breadth of the
tort]."34 The "publicity given to private life tort" is one of Prosser's four torts that
constitute invasion of privacy as reflected by the Restatement (Second) of Torts.35
This tort provides a legal cause of action if an individual publicizes a matter
involving another's private life that is "highly offensive to a reasonable person and
is not of legitimate concern to the public."36 Decisions in cases involving a media
defendant frequently weigh in favor of the media defendant "if the information was
lawfully obtained, was newsworthy, and was of legitimate public concern."37

27. Denno, supranote 16, at 1126 (citing Paul Marcus & Tara L. McMahon, LimitingDisclosure
of Rape Victims' Identities,64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1020, 1034 (1991)).
28. See Lance Pugmire, Affidavits in Bryant Case to Stay Sealed,L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2003, at

DI (reporting that the accuser was the target of threats).
29. See Denno, supra note 16, at 1130.
30. See Halpern, supra note 24, at 540.
31. EdwardJ. Bloustein, Privacy,Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warrenand Brandeis"Tort
Petty and Unconstitutionalas Well?, 46 TEX. L. REV. 611, 619 (1968)).

32. Id. at619.
33. Id. at 540 (citing Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 82 (XY. Va. 1984)).
34. Id. at 540.
35. Id. at 541 (citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960)); Carol
Schultz Vento, Annotation, Proprietyof PublishingIdentity ofSexual Assault Victim, 40 A.L.R.5th
787, 794 (1996) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1976)).
36. Vento, supra note 35, at 794 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1976)).

37. Id. at 795.
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Another basis on which states have granted legal protection is by statutes which
impose civil sanctions, criminal sanctions, or both, for publishing rape victims'
names.3" Only a few jurisdictions have these statutes.39 South Carolina, Florida,

and Georgia are the only states that have statutes that criminalize publication of
The Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld the
such information.4"
constitutionality of its statute providing criminal sanctions."' In Florida and
Georgia, statutes were held unconstitutional in Florida Star v. B.J.F."2 and Cox
BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohn,'3 respectively. Georgia has amended its statute to
satisfy the demands of the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion in Cox." Florida's
attempt to revise its statute was unsuccessful; the Florida Supreme Court struck
down the amended statute as unconstitutional.45 The collective effect of these
decisions was to make the imposition of criminal and civil liability by states on
media defendants difficult at best, and left to be decided on a case-by-case basis.46
Additionally, some states recognize civil liability with the availability of an
action for damages. State legislatures that have provided civil remedies for sexual
assault victims whose names are published include New York, Massachusetts,
Nebraska, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 7 New York, in particular,
enacted the statutory right of privacy in lieu of the common law tort to protect
"settled principles of law" in its jurisprudence.'
C. Relevant Supreme Court Decisions Reveal a Grim Outlook
1. Cox BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohn
In Cox BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohn, 9 Justice White considered the issue of
whether "consistent[] with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a State may

38. Id. at 794.
39. Id.
40. Kevin O'Brien, Comment, South Carolina: Last Haven for Rape Victim Privacy?, 50 S.C.
L. REv. 873, 873 (1999).
41. See generallyDorman v. Aiken Communications, Inc., 303 S.C. 63,67,398 S.E.2d 687,689
(1990) (finding that South Carolina's rape shield statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-730 (Law. Co-op.
1976), does not allow a civil remedy).
42. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
43. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
44. O'Brien, supra note 40, at 873 n.3.
45. Florida v. Globe Communications, Corp., 648 So. 2d 110, 114 (Fla. 1994).
46. See O'Brien, supra note 40, at 877.
47. Prine, supra note 9, at 1008 n.77-78 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 1B (West
1989)); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-201 (West 1997); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-b,c (McKinney
1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1 (1997); VA. CODEANN. § 8.01-40 (Michie 1992); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.50 (West 1997)).
48. Prine, supra note 9, at 1008 (quoting Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442,
447 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1902)).
49. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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extend a cause of action for damages for invasion of privacy caused by the
publication of the name of a deceased rape victim which was publicly revealed in
connection with the prosecution of the crime."5 In this particular case, appellee's
teen-aged daughter was raped and killed." Appellant reporter learned the name of
the victim from court records made available to him by the clerk of court and
broadcast the name of the deceased rape victim. 2 Relying on Georgia's rape shield
statute, the girl's father sought money damages, claiming the broadcaster violated
his right to privacy by publicizing his daughter's name.53 The publisher claimed
privilege based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 4 The trial court held that
the statute granted a civil remedy to victims injured in such a way, and the court
granted summary judgment for the plaintiff.55
The Georgia Supreme Court used the rape shield statute's existence as evidence
of public policy that a rape victim's name is not of legitimate public concern.56 The
court found the statute was a "legitimate limitation on the right of freedom of
expression contained in the First Amendment" because the interest in the identity
of the victim did not "rise to the level of First Amendment protection." 7
Justice White, in an opinion reversing the Georgia Supreme Court's ruling,
noted that the tort of public disclosure of private facts "most directly confront[s] the
constitutional freedoms of speech and press" because it involves an injury resulting
from publication of information "whether true or not."58 The Court avoided
answering the question as to whether it is constitutional for a state to "define and
protect an area of privacy free from unwanted publicity in the press." 9 Instead, the
Court decided a very narrow issue based on the facts of this case: Can a state protect
the identity of a rape victim by imposing sanctions on truthful publication of
information garnered from records which are publicly accessible? 0
There could be no doubt the crime and the judicial proceedings were of
"legitimate concern to the public" and therefore, "[fell] within the responsibility of
the press to report the operations of government."'" The Court reasoned that "[a]
'62
trial is a public event [and w]hat transpires in the court room is public property.
This left few options for sexual assault victims who want to participate in the
prosecution of their attackers. Courts have no "perquisite ... to suppress, edit, or

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 471.
Id.
Id. at 472-74.
Id. at 474.
Id.
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 474 (1975).

56. Id. at 475.
57. Id. (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 200 S.E.2d 127, 134 (Ga. 1973)).
58. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975).
59. Id. at 491.

60. Id.
61. Id. at 492.
62. Id. at 492 (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)).
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censor events which transpire in proceedings before it.""
The Court's failure to commit to the broader issue indicated a recognition that
a private individual may require heightened protection from invasions of privacy,
but only under very particular facts. The Court failed to indicate what would
constitute a protection-invoking fact pattern. The result is that sexual assault victims
do not know what particular facts would protect them, and cannot make decisions
in reliance on a remedy.
The Court recognized that there are categories of expression which are of "such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
' 64
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." The fact that
the state put the name in the records, however, meant the state found the name to
be of social value. 65 The Court proposed that states protect the identities of the
victims by not having them in public documentation or exposing them in other
ways,6 6 and suggested that the media must decide what to publish as opposed to the
judiciary. 67 The Court delivered the issue back to interested parties to figure out
how to handle this delicate balance.
For plaintiffs like those in Doe 2, this does not bode well because it reveals that
Circuit was correct in its application of the law. Cox implies that even
Fourth
the
with the judge's order for the press to remain silent about the name of the victim,
prints. 68
courts do not have any particular power to control what the press
Additionally, the proceeding itselfcould be viewed as being a public record because
it is public property.69
2. FloridaStar v. B.J.F.
Another critical decision in the area of public disclosure is Florida Star v.

B.J.F.70 FloridaStar involved an appeal brought by a newspaper publisher found

civilly liable, pursuant to a Florida statute, for publishing a sexual assault victim's
name. 7 ' A newspaper employee obtained the information from a police report
publicly accessible in a pressroom.72 The lower court found that the statute
balanced "First Amendment and privacy rights" in a "narrow set" of
circumstances. 73 Additionally, the judge found the newspaper per se negligent, and

63. Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 492-93 (quoting Craig, 331 U.S. at 374).
64. Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 495 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942)).

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

495.
496.
492-93 (citing Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)).
492 (citing Craig,331 U.S. at 374).

70. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
71. Id. at 526.
72. Id. at 527.

73. Id. at 528.
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a jury awarded $75,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive
damages.74

On appeal, the United States Supreme Court extended Cox, thus making a tort
or statutory remedy for publication of sexual assault victims' names even less
accessible.75 The Court limited the tort further by reaffirming the press' rights to
publish not only information obtained during court proceedings, but also
information prior to court proceedings.76
The Court applied the standard from Smith v. Daily Mail PublishingCo.77 to
limit the decision to the facts of the case. 7 ' The Daily Mail standard requires that
"if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public
significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the
information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order."79 In
applying the Daily Mail standard to FloridaStar's facts, the Court found that the
fact that the state agency exercised its discretion in making information confidential
did not make obtaining the information about the rape unlawful when furnished by
the government."0 Furthermore, the Court found the article on the violent crime,
rather than the identity reported in it, to be "a matter of public significance."8"
The Court found that the interests of the victims of sexual assault are "highly
significant," 2 and once again, the Court declined the opportunity to completely rule
out that there may be some circumstances under which a state may need to impose
civil sanctions to advance the interests of the victim within the bounds of the Daily
Mail standard. 3 The facts in FloridaStar, however, did not warrant such state
action according to the Court.84 An important reason was that the newspaper gained
access to the information because of the government's mistake. 5 The government
could have prevented the press' access to the victim's full name simply by not
including it in the report.86

74. Id. at 528-29.
75. Id. at 541.
76. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).
77. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
78. FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 533 (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103
(1979)).
79. Id. at 533 (citing Smith, 443 U.S. at 103) (emphasis added)).
80. Id., 491 U.S. at 536.
81. Id. at 536-37.
82. Id. at 537. But see Linda Perry, When Identities are 'Wrongfully Disclosed': How The
Florida Star v. B.J.F. has ChangedPrivacy Protection,3 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 101, 130 (1990)
(reasoning that Justice White's dissenting opinion misinterprets the majority opinion when he said the
Court found the interests ofrape victims were not ofthe highest order; implying that the majority never
recognized "highly significant" as being less significant than "highest order").
83. FloridaStar v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 537.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 538.
86. Id.
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The Court also held that the Florida standard of per se liability was too broad.
The Court distinguished the civil liability imposed by the statute from the civil
liability created by the invasion of privacy tort by noting that the per se standard did
not allow the case-by-case examination of whether or not the information disclosed
was "highly offensive.""8 Instead, the liability was automatic regardless of
mitigating facts or scienter8 9 Also, the statute likely was too underinclusive to
9
accomplish its goal.9 ° A rape shield statute must be applied "evenhandedly."
Suggestions for protection of information in the hands of the government
included "classify[ing] certain information, establish[ing] and enforc[ing]
procedures ensuring its redacted release, and extend[ing] a damages remedy against
the government or its officials where the government's mishandling of sensitive
information leads to its dissemination."92 In cases where the government holds the
information, there is always "a less drastic means than punishing truthful
publication"93 because the press would not be the "source of the release"; rather, the
government would be.94 Punishing publication of information that is available to
the public probably would not advance a state interest, and laying responsibility in
the hands of the government would be more narrowly tailored to fit the interests
involved.9"
In sum, Cox and FloridaStar together whittle away at the potential for use of
the public facts tort or confidentiality statutes to protect the names of sexual assault
victims. These cases effectively tell us what the standard is not, but do not tell us
what it is. The lower courts and state legislatures are left to continue testing the
waters. It is important to note that the United States Supreme Court has examined
very few private facts cases, with only two brought by or on behalf of sexual assault
96
victims; all were decided in favor of the media defendant. The Court has chosen
its cases carefully and appears to suggest to leave the press alone and focus on
procedures which have led to the publication of such information. Once it gets to
the press, a sexual assault victim's name becomes public property. Even though this
is not necessarily the result intended by the Cox Court, as is indicated by Justice

87. Id. at 539.

88. Id.
89. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 539 (1989).

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 540.
Id.
Id. at 534.
Id.

94. Id. at 535.
95. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 (1989); see also Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469, 495 (1975) ("By placing the information in the public domain on official court records, the
State must be presumed to have concluded that the public interest was thereby being served.").
96. See Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 496-97 (holding "the First and Fourteenth Amendments
bar[]" Georgia from making the media defendant civilly liable for publication of a sexual assault
victim's name); see also Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541 (holding that "where a newspaper publishes
truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed... only
when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order").
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White's dissent in Florida Star, the opinions are consistent because the only
solution offered is to give the issue back to the government to decide how to
implement these decisions.
III. DOE 2 V.ASSOCIATED PRESS AND THE STATE OF THE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA
South Carolina addresses the publication of sexual assault victims' names
through the invasion of privacy tort and through legislation.97 In recent years, these
two routes to a remedy for public disclosure of a sexual assault victim's name have
grown contradictory. While the statute provides criminal sanctions for publishing
the name of a rape victim, the tort has become ineffective in protecting the
anonymity of sexual assault victims.
A. Background
One of the earliest South Carolina cases to recognize a public disclosure right
to privacy tort was Meetze v. Associated Press.98 While this case was not brought
on behalf of a sexual assault victim, it is cited in many of South Carolina's cases
addressing the issue, and set the standard for privacy cases in South Carolina
jurisprudence.
In Meetze, the identities of a married twelve-year-old girl, who had given birth
to a child, and her husband were published in several papers despite their repeated
requests to maintain their anonymity.99 The Supreme Court of South Carolina

found that anything of "legitimate public or general interest" is publishable as long
as it is not "mere curiosity."'" The Meetze court further defined the boundaries of
the tort by noting that "[r]evelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view
of the victim's position as to outrage the community's notions of decency."', ° A

person may lose his right to privacy, however, by becoming an unwilling participant
in an "occurrence of public or general interest."' 2 The Meetze court declined to
grant relief, based on the principles above, because a twelve-year-old giving birth
was of public interest as an unusual "biological occurrence," and because the birth
of the child was a matter of public record.1 3
The most important South Carolina case in the area of privacy rights is Doe v.

97. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-730 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (providing criminal sanctions for publication of sexual assault victims' names); Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502,
504-05 (4th Cir. 1963) (reaffirming that South Carolina recognizes a common law cause of action for
"intrusion upon privacy").
98. 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956).

99. Id. at 333-34, 95 S.E.2d at 607-08.
100. Id. at 337, 95 S.E.2d at 609 (quoting 41 AM. JUR., § 14 (1946)).
101. Id. at 337, 95 S.E.2d at 609 (quoting Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.
1940)).

102. Id. at 337, 95 S.E.2d at 609.
103. Id. at 338, 95 S.E.2d at 610.
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Berkeley Publishers.'" There, the state supreme court held that a newspaper's
truthful publication that an inmate was a sexual assault victim while incarcerated
is "of legitimate public.., interest" as a matter of law.' The court of appeals
decision that the issue was for the jury to consider was reversed because the court
"erred in separating the plaintiffs identity from the event."'" The court applied
Meetze and reasoned that state law requires that when a person is involved in an
incident "of public or general interest,... 'the publication of his connection with
7
such an occurrence is not an invasion of his right to privacy.""
Berkeley is consistent with FloridaStar, although the Berkeley court did not
cite FloridaStar. In Berkeley, the Supreme Court of South Carolina, like the
United States Supreme Court in FloridaStar, found a crime-related incident to be
the public's business as a matter of law, taking from the jury's hands the chance to
decide. 0 8 The Berkeley court's decision is contrary to the legislature's impression
of what constitutes public interest, as is indicated by South Carolina's rape shield
statute, and it is reflective of the finding in Florida Star that the public has an
interest in crime. The Berkeley court used the same logic as the United States
Supreme Court in FloridaStar when it declined to separate the victim's identity
from the event at issue.
B. Doe 2 v. Associated Press
The most recent decision addressing publication of sexual assault victims'
°9
In Doe 2, a sexual
identities in South Carolina is Doe 2 v. Associated Press.
molestation victim brought an action against a media defendant for publishing his
name." 0 The victim agreed to make a victim impact statement after the judge
allegedly ordered the press to refrain from publishing his name. "' Later, the victim
learned from friends that his name had been published."' The trial 3court awarded
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Doe appealed."
South Carolina demands that the defendant must have "intentionally committed
'public disclosure of private facts about the plaintiff-facts 'in which there is no
4
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying South
legitimate public interest."'
Carolina law, reasoned that the courtroom was open to anyone and South Carolina

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

329 S.C. 412,496 S.E.2d 636 (1998).
Id. at 413, 496 S.E.2d at 636.
Id. at 414, 496 S.E.2d at 637.
Id. at 414, 496 S.E.2d at 637 (quoting Meetze, 230 S.C. at 337, 95 S.E.2d at 609).
Id. at 413, 496 S.E.2d at 636.

109. 331 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2003).

110. Id. at 419.
111. Id. at 419-20.

112. Id. at 420.
113. Idat 419.
114. Id. at 421 (quoting Snakenberg v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 299 S.C. 164, 170-71,383 S.E.2d
2, 6 (Ct. App. 1989)).
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case law does not indicate that there is a privacy interest in information obtained
from open court proceedings."' Further, closing the courtroom would have been
contrary to public policy as "our criminal law tradition insists on public indictment,
public trial, and public imposition of sentence.""' 6 Public access to criminal
proceedings "is essential to maintaining public respect for the criminal justice
system, ensuring its integrity, and protecting the rights of the accused."" 7 The Doe
2 court indicated that the name of the victim, as information revealed in the
courtroom, is certainly a matter of public interest."' In consideration of the
circumstances under which the victim's name became public concern, the Doe 2
court stated that, as in Berkeley, the victim's involvement in an incident in which
the public has an interest makes that connection of public interest as well, even
though that involvement was involuntary." 9 Thus, the victim's claim was properly
dismissed despite that he was not a willing participant in the event precipitating the
trial, and he likely would not have been a willing participant in the post-trial
proceeding had the judge not assured he would remain anonymous to the public.
The Doe 2 result is consistent with recent South Carolina case law and recent
United States Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court of South Carolina
stated that crime is a legitimate public interest and implied that the victim's name
is entwined with the crime story. 2 0 The United States Supreme Court has not made
the constitutionality of the privacy tort completely clear in the context of publishing
sexual assault victims' names, but has indicated that publicly accessible information
is fair game when truthfully reported, and the public has a legitimate interest in
crime as a matter of law. The legal analysis in Doe 2 was correct based on
Berkeley, or on Cox and FloridaStar, but the ultimate outcome is harsh.
C. South Carolina'sRape Shield Statute Does Not Provide a Civil Remedy
South Carolina addresses publication of sexual assault victims' names by
statute'2 ' and has done so since before 1912. 2 Dorman v. Aiken Communications,
Inc.'23 changed the potential impact of the statute by addressing whether the rape
shield statute creates a civil cause of action. 24

115. Doe 2 v. Associated Press, 331 F.3d 417, 421-22 (4th Cir. 2003).
116. Id. at 421 (quoting Smith v. Doe, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 1150 (2003).
117. Id. (quoting Smith, 123 S. Ct. at 1150).
118. Id. at 421-22.
119. Id. at 422 (quoting Doe v. Berkeley Publishers, 329 S.C. 412, 414, 496 S.E.2d 636, 637
(1998)).
120. Doe, 329 S.C. at 413-14, 496 S.E.2d at 636-37.
121. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-730 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
122. See O'Brien, supra note 40, at 874 n.17.
123. 303 S.C. 63, 398 S.E.2d 687 (1990).
124. Id. at 67,398 S.E.2d at 689; cf.Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins., Co., 322 F.2d 502,
505 (4th Cir. 1963) (declining to address whether the statute would allow a civil remedy because the
women involved had a case for common law tortious invasion of privacy based on the statute's
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Dorman involved a sexual assault victim's attempt to bring a civil action
against a publisher for reporting her identity in violation of South Carolina's5 rape
The
shield statute after discovering the name and details from private sources.
26
victim was a real estate agent who was raped at gunpoint.' The Supreme Court

of South Carolina held that the statute on which the plaintiff based her tort action
was not unconstitutional, but did not create a private cause of action for civil
liability against the publisher.'27 The Dorman court found that the statute at issue,
as indicated by its clear language, is a criminal statute which provides criminal
2
sanctions for the purpose of protecting the public at large and not individuals.
The statute is now of little value to a rape victim whose identity is revealed by
the publisher. The criminal sanctions, aside from potential jail time which likely
would be reserved for the most egregious scenarios, do not carry the same deterrent
value as potential tort damages. Arguably, a publisher could weigh the value of
papers sold, the unfettered freedom to publish information he deems publishable,
and the likelihood that sanctions would be exacted, against the cost of the fine
imposed, and not be deterred from publishing a victim's name.
It seems that the law is settled that if something is a part of a public record, it
is then a matter of public interest. A "proper case" would be one in which the
interests were so significant as to be considered of the highest order; there were no
other alternatives to protect the victim; it is based on common law or statutes
29
allowing case-by-case analysis; and the information was unlawfully obtained.1 If
the press obtains this information legally, as it surely would since it is accessible to
the public, then the information is likely privileged with or without the consent of
the subject. This privilege attaches despite the fact that the information is merely
peripheral to a true story. Victims appear to be left with few options: increasing
government regulation of what goes into a public record; allowing the press to selfregulate, 30 thus leaving sexual assault victims vulnerable to a critical and
purposeful, yet still profit-driven, business; or continuing to present variations of the
facts to the courts until a proper case is found.
IV. THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
This section explores alternative approaches, both successful and unsuccessful,
for concealing the identities of sexual assault victims or permitting certain remedies,
and analyzes how lower courts have received these approaches.

existence).
125. Dorman, 303 S.C. at 65, 398 S.E.2d at 688.
126. Id. at 64-65, 398 S.E.2d at 688.
127. Id. at 66-67, 398 S.E.2d at 689.

128. Id. at 67, 398 S.E.2d at 689.
129. Perry, supra note 82, at 130.
130. See Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Fla. Television Co., 436 So. 2d 328, 332 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (finding that the media must self-monitor using its own balancing test).
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Generally,Alternative Causes ofAction Have Not Been Successful

Attorneys for sexual assault victims who wish to remain anonymous have

attempted to use other causes of action to support, or replace, the tort ofpublication

of private facts because the United States Supreme Court has rendered the tort
ineffective in this context.'
Some suggested alternatives include fraudulent
misrepresentation and infliction of emotional distress.' 32 These alternative legal

theories must be excluded from any workable, consistent solution.
Courts have rejected intentional misrepresentation claims because a "promise

to do something in the future . . . which . . . is not kept, is not fraud."'' 33
Additionally, it is difficult at best to establish a pecuniary loss resulting from

publication, which is an essential element of any claim for fraud.'34 Intentional

infliction of emotional distress claims have been unsuccessful in general because

the use of a victim's name is typically not "outrageous in character, or so extreme
in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency in a civilized

community.' 35 Ultimately, courts have indicated that the interests involved remain
the same regardless of whether attorneys call the claim intentional infliction of
emotional distress or publication of private facts, and therefore, such claims must
36

fail.'

Where a publisher, directly or through a reporter, has made a promise, courts
may allow a plaintiff to proceed on a promissory estoppel theory because the United
States Supreme Court has indicated that general laws apply to the press as they do

to individual citizens.3 7 Unfortunately, many victims never have an actual promise

on which they rely. The typical scenario, as reflected in cases such as FloridaStar
and Cox, is that the reporter obtains the victim's name either through public records

or court proceedings.13 8 When the State attempts to play the role of editor for the

131. The Doe 2 court summarily rejected each alternative claim advanced by the plaintiff. Doe
2 v. Associated Press,331 F.3d 417,422 (4th Cir. 2003). The fraudulent misrepresentation claim was
based on the theory that the reporter made an implicit agreement with the plaintiff when he failed to
reveal his intent to publish the victim's identity despite the judge's order that the information must
remain confidential. Id. at 420. The Doe 2 court refused to recognize in the press a fiduciary duty to
strangers about whom they publish stories. Id. at 421.
132. See id. at 420-22; see also Morgan v. Celender, 780 F. Supp. 307, 310-11 (W.D. Pa. 1992)
(rejecting misrepresentation and intentional infliction of emotional distress arguments).
133. Morgan, 780 F. Supp. at 311 (citing Krause v. Great Lakes Holdings, Inc., 563 A.2d 1182,
1187 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 310.
136. See Uranga v. Federated Publ'ns, Inc., 67 P.3d 29,35 (Idaho 2003) (changing the name of
the cause of action to infliction of emotional distress makes no difference constitutionally).
137. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671-72 (1991).
138. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (holding that the publication of information about
the victim that was obtained in a pressroom at the police station is protected by the First Amendment);
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding that the publication of information about the
victim that was obtained from the clerk of court is protected under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments).
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press by imposing liability upon publication of certain information, courts are likely
39
to find such actions to violate the First Amendment. When the parties themselves
determine their obligations, the court may find that generally applicable laws apply
40
because of a business-like relationship. If applied to more typical circumstances,
a promissory estoppel approach would not be a successful alternative because there
would be no promise. Alternative legal theories, then, frequently accompany or
replace the publication of private facts tort, but these theories are not any more
workable than the privacy tort.
B. Injunctions
Injunctions initially seem logical in facilitating anonymity and likely would
have protected the victim in Doe 2. Why, then, are they not systematically used to
preserve the anonymity of those who are sexually assaulted?
Injunctions and contempt orders pose serious constitutional problems when
used against the media in the context of court proceedings. Any order to refrain
from publishing information disclosed in an open courtroom, and any contempt
because of the control
charge for such publication, are subject to close examination
4 There are rare times
the court would exercise over the content of expression.
when a prior restraint is constitutionally valid, but when the information is disclosed
in public forums or records, "the United States Supreme Court and appellate courts
4
around the country have consistently rejected any restraint on its publication."'
43

Prior restraints seldom are successful'

and are not likely to be a reliable alternative

for victims.'
C. Statutes Directed Toward Nonpublication
Statutes targeting publication of victims' names (i.e., rape shield statutes or rape
confidentiality statutes) provide another alternative approach to protecting sexual
assault victims' anonymity. Reliance on this approach is tenuous because Cox and
FloridaStar struck down statutes targeting publication. FloridaStar indicated,
however, that not all nonpublication statute's would be found unconstitutional and

139. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670.
140. Id.
141. See Jeffries v. Mississippi, 724 So.2d 897, 899-900 (Miss. 1998) (stating that a prior
restraint on speech is presumptively invalid and finding that a court order to refrain from publishing
restraint).
information obtained in open court and the subsequent contempt charge amounted to prior
900.
at
Id.
142.
143. See N. Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring)
and
(implying that restraints cannot occur unless disclosure "will surely result in direct, immediate,
irreparable damage to our Nation or its people").
144. But see In re a Minor, 595 N.E.2d 1052, 1055-57 (11. 1992) (finding that court admittance
of
conditioned upon a pledge of silence was proper). In re a Minor does not reflect the majority
law.
bad
make
facts
hard
that
adage
the
illustrate
to
appears
and
jurisdictions on this issue,
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suggested the form of a constitutional statute.145 The interest that would justify civil
liability must be "of the highest order." 46 The problem is that the Court also
implied that the interest in protecting the information at issue was outweighed by
First Amendment concerns, especially in the context of a crime-related story. If a
statute is to survive a constitutional hurdle, it would also have to allow for a caseby-case review.'

It appears, however, that the Daily Mail balancing analysis

would always make this statutory approach risky, or at least ineffective, as long as
courts can theorize other alternatives to punishing the press.' 48
D. Statutes Directed Toward GovernmentalNondisclosure
An approach to protection of rape victims' privacy that appears to have the
United States Supreme Court's approval is legislation directed toward governmental
nondisclosure of such information. In both Cox and Florida Star, the Court
suggested that government agencies should take steps to prevent disclosure of
information that is considered confidential and even recommended "extend[ing] a
damages remedy against the government or its officials where the government's
mishandling of sensitive information leads to its dissemination."' 49
California and New York have noteworthy forms of legislation addressing
governmental disclosure of sexual assault victims' names.'
In People v.
Ramirez,' the California statute precluded a defendant in a criminal sexual assault
case from forcing the accuser to use her real name in court proceedings." 2 The
Ramirez court, after noting that the statute was enacted in response to Cox and its
progeny, found that the defendant's right to confront his accuser did not outweigh
the victim's right to privacy, and in any event, was only slightly impinged upon by
the statute's provision for the use of pseudonyms. 3 The statute allows the use of
pseudonyms in court records as long as it is "reasonably necessary" to protect the

145. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 538-41 (1989).
146. Id. at 533.
147. O'Brien, supranote 40, at 884-85 (posing that changing South Carolina's rape shield statute

to allow for case-by-case review might allow the state to salvage the statute).
148. See generally Dye v. Wallace, 553 S.E.2d 561,562-63 (Ga. 2001) (striking down Georgia's

rape confidentiality statute as unconstitutional because the punishment was not "'narrowly tailored to
a state interest of the highest order"') (quoting Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541); Florida v. Globe
Communications Corp., 648 So. 2d 110, 112 (Fla. 1994)) (finding Florida's rape shield statute

unconstitutional because the same interests in this case "were not sufficiently furthered by the automatic
imposition of civil sanctions under the statute to establish a 'need' within the meaning of Daily Mail
for such extreme measures").
149. FloridaStar,491 U.S. at 534.
150. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 293.5 (West 1992); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50-b, c (McKinney
1992).

151. 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 9 (Ct. App. 1997).
152. Id. at 14.
153. Id. at 12, 15.
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victim's privacy and will not "unduly prejudice the prosecution or the defense."'
New York's statutory scheme also places responsibility for protection of sexual
assault victims' identities in government hands.' The scheme extends privacy
56
protection from governmental disclosure to adult sexual assault victims.
Disclosure may occur only upon application to the court and victim notification, and
at the court's discretion or with the victim's permission.' 57 Additionally, the scheme
creates a statutory cause of action to recover damages suffered "by reason of such
wrongful disclosure" and allows "reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing
plaintiff."' s8
It is significant that neither statute punishes the media for truthful publication
of the identity and details personal to a sexual assault victim. Instead, they focus
on the public official who disclosed the information. This approach is clearly in
line with Cox and FloridaStar.These statutory schemes also allow for case-by-case
consideration in that they allow judicial discretion and the balancing of interests.
Although Florida Star did not specifically call for case-by-case analysis in the
context of governmental nondisclosure, such discretion is strongly implied in the
Court's rejection of the per se standard used in Florida's rape confidentiality statute
and the Court's use of Daily Mail to balance competing interests.

E. Redacted Records
Redaction of information is another device for consideration in protecting a
victim's anonymity. Redacting names would simply involve blacking out the names
of victims in publicly accessible information. The FloridaStar opinion specifically
mentioned and approved the use of redaction in the context of sexual assault
victims.5 9 An important factor in the use of this device is whether the state
considers the victim's name confidential. Freedom of Information statutes vary
do not specifically catagorize sexual assault
from state to state, and some states
60
confidential.1
as
names
victims'
In Doe v. BoardofRegents ofthe UniversitySystem of Georgia,16 ' the Georgia
Court of Appeals crafted a solution to this problem. 62 The plaintiff could find no
support in Georgia's Open Records Act for an injunction restraining the press from

154. Id. at 12 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 293.5 (West 1992)).
155. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50-b, c (McKinney 1992).

156. Id.
157. Id. at §50-b (McKinney 1992); see also Deborah S.v. Diorio, 583 N.Y.S.2d 872, 881 (Civ.
Ct. 1992) (finding that the victim of acquaintance rape was entitled to keep her identity confidential
pursuant to the 1991 New York statutory amendments in a civil suit against her attacker), modified on
other grounds,af'd, 612 N.Y.S.2d 542 (App. Term 1994).
158. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50-c.
159. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 534 (1989).
160. See GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-72 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-40 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
161. 452 S.E.2d 776 (1994).

162. Id. at 780.
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gaining access to police records targeting her rape.'63 In the alternative, she argued
that her name should be redacted by virtue of Georgia's rape victim confidentiality
statute. ' The court stated that the law favors disclosure and any exclusion or
exemption not enumerated in the Act would have to be narrowly applied." 5 The
Board ofRegents court reasoned, though, that in the event of a "stalemate between
the Open Records Act and the confidentiality statute, it must be resolved in favor
of providing the shield rather than the sword." 66 Because the confidentiality statute
was specific as opposed to the Open Records Act, the Board of Regents court67
granted the injunction preventing the University from releasing the victim's name. '
The rape confidentiality statute was later held unconstitutional in Dye v. Wallace.'61
The application of one statute to fortify another seems sound, however. If
legislation is drafted according to the Florida Star suggestion, redacting records
seems to be a relatively sound tool.
V.

RECOMMENDED LEGISLATION

Regulation addressing governmental nondisclosure is the most reliable option
for protecting the privacy of sexual assault victims. In FloridaStar and Cox, the
United States Supreme Court endorsed this type of regulation as a reasonable
alternative.169 The Court gives its approval even though increased governmental
regulation of the media's access to information would be contrary to the policy of
subjecting the government to public scrutiny. It appears that there is no completely
satisfactory alternative given the nature of the conflict and the interests involved.
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that legislation targeting the
governmental nondisclosure might be appropriate because it would be more
narrowly tailored to protect the interests involved.
Several states such as New York, California, and Texas have statutory schemes
that address the issue of governmental disclosure of sexual assault victims'
identities. Some statutory schemes allow governmental discretion in determining
what should be disclosed, or whether pseudonyms should be used. 70 Such
discretion might be more acceptable to the Supreme Court because it is less drastic
than a carte blanche application. Florida Star indicated that case-by-case
consideration is necessary in rape shield statutes, rather than a per se standard.
Statutes addressing governmental nondisclosure and those that address

163. Id. at 779.
164. Id.

165. Id. at 780.
166. Id.
167. Doe v. Board of Regents, 452 S.E.2d 776, 780 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
168. 553 S.E.2d 561, 561-63 (Ga. 2001).
169. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 534 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
496 (1975).

170. Two examples are Georgia's Open Records Act and South Carolina's Freedom of Information Act. GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-72 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-40 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
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nondisclosure by the press should be distinguished, however. The interests are not
the same in cases of governmental nondisclosure. The reason for demanding a per
se standard is that the singling out of the media from the general public violates the
First Amendment. Statutes that address the government's disclosure of names would
be applied equally. If a nondisclosure statute directed toward the government
allowed too much discretion, it would be difficult to impose any sanctions for
violations because the duty would no longer be ministerial.171 Thus, legislation
directed toward the government must not allow for so much discretion that it makes
the scheme ineffective and superfluous.
A cause of action against government agencies, or some sort of compensation
system, would be a necessary part of such a statute in order to make it more
effective.' 72 The problem in many cases is government officials disclosing
information considered confidential. ' If no remedy were allowed, there would be
little deterrent value, and little incentive to take precautions. The plaintiff in Doe
2, however, would not benefit from a private cause of action because the judge
would be shielded through immunity, as would the solicitor.'74 Arguably, the
existence of a civil remedy might make everyone involved more cautious about
protecting the victim's identity and educating victims about safeguards available to
them.
Upon determining that the names of sexual assault victims are confidential, the
legislature should develop a scheme that would call for more consistent use of
South Carolina uses
pseudonyms in court room documents and proceedings.'
pseudonyms, but has no statutory procedure in place to call for consistency on pain
of sanctions. California and Texas statutes call for judicial discretion to allow the
judge to consider the rights of both the accuser and the accused, and pseudonyms
are used upon application of the accuser. 76 In People v. Ramirez, 177 the court held

171. See generallyBloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673,687(6th Cir. 1998) (holding that a law enforce-

ment official was not liable for invasion of privacy because ofqualified immunity due to lack of notice,
but that law enforcement officers in the state were on notice from this decision); Bellamy v. Brown,
305 S.C. 291, 291, 295, 408 S.E.2d 219, 219, 221 (1991) (holding that FOIA, a statutory disclosure

scheme, created no special duty ofconfidentiality to an individual through its exceptions because the
exceptions are discretionary).
172. See FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 534.
173. See Doe 2 v. Associated Press, 331 F.3d 417, 419 (4th Cir. 2003); Star-Telegram, Inc. v.
Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex. 1995); Macon Tel. Publ'g Co. v. Tatum, 436 S.E.2d 655, 657 (Ga.
1993); Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1515, 1517-18 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
174. Note that the Doe 2 opinion does not lay blame on any particular person for releasing the

name in such a manner, and the victim participated in the proceedings voluntarily.
175. E-mail from Jay Bender, Esquire, Baker, Ravenel & Bender, LLP, to Kimberly Blackburn,
Law Student, University of South Carolina School ofLaw (Sept. 16, 2003, 06:50:00 EST) (on file with
author) (indicating that, in Doe 2, pseudonym use might have effectively balanced the interests of the
press and society and the interests of the victim).
176. People v. Ramirez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 9, 15 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing CAL. PENALCODE § 293.5
(West 1992)); Star-Telegram, Inc., 915 S.W.2d at 477 (Gonzalez, J., concurring) (referring to a Texas

law that allows a victim to use pseudonyms).
177. 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 9 (Ct. App. 1997).
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that the Califomia statute allowing use of a pseudonym by a sexual assault victim
in a civil court action brought against her attacker did not deny the accused his Sixth
Amendment rights because it allowed a balancing of rights.' 78 Of course, it would
be a more effective protection of privacy if pseudonyms were systematically and
automatically used in cases of sexual assault. This systematic use could protect a
victim like the victim in Doe 2 from any carelessness that would lead to disclosure
of his identity. The legislature could provide for the same balancing of rights by
having the accused party make application for disclosure of the victim's name. This
approach, modeled after the New York statute in Diorio, would allow for
consideration of the rights involved but would leave less room for error.
An additional requirement should be to systematically redact the names of rape
victims from police records. It is not clear how this requirement could be reconciled
with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in South Carolina, or similar acts in
other jurisdictions. South Carolina's FOIA statutes allow for exemptions.'79 In
South Carolina's FOIA, however, the exemptions listed are acted upon at the
discretion of the government. 80 This might be best addressed as it was in Board of
Regents, where the court used the rape confidentiality statute to create an exception
under the State's Open Records Act.' The Supreme Court of Georgia later found
the rape confidentiality statute used was unconstitutional,' 82 but the approach seems
sound. The United States Supreme Court indicated in FloridaStar that states may
consider sexual assault victims' names confidential."
Thus, there is support
behind a state legislature developing statutes calling for redacted names as standard
procedure. 84
'
As with the application of tort law or confidentiality statutes, the use of
legislation addressing governmental nondisclosure is not without its problems and
likely would result in continued debate. An advantage is that there would be no
direct conflict between the victim and the media. Additionally, such legislation
would lead to a more systematic handling of personal information upon which

178. Id. at 15.

179. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Doe v. Board of Regents, 452 S.E.2d 776, 780 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
Dye v. Wallace, 553 S.E.2d 561, 561 (Ga. 2001).
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 534, 537 (1989).
South Carolina has addressed the rights of victims in its South Carolina Victims' Rights

Amendment to the State Constitution. The Hon. Marc H. Westbrook & Thad H. Westbrook, Balancing
The Scales: Victims'Rights in South Carolina'sJustice System, S.C. LAWYER, May-June 1999, at 27
(quoting S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24) (indicating the purpose of the amendment is "[t]o preserve and protect

victims' rights to justice and due process."). The implementing statutes address the accused giving
restitution to the victim if convicted, but do not call for civil liability, and do not call for use of
pseudonyms or redacting information specifically. Westbrook & Westbrook, supra, at 29-30. South
Carolina, by statute, classifies a victim's name and identifying information as confidential except when
used for the purpose of contacting the victim when the convicted perpetrator has changed holding
facilities, which illustrates the legislature's interest in protecting victims' privacy. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-1525(C) (Law. Co-op. 2003).
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victims can rely. However, such legislation might foster conflict between the press
and state and local governments because the policies behind protecting the rights
of the press are the same whether their foe is the victim in the courtroom or the
government in the records room. There may be no constitutionally bullet-proof
solution. It appears that the United States Supreme Court has offered a solution it
believes to be the best available in consideration of the interests involved. The
press retains its right to publish information it obtains, even though it may be an
illusion of freedom. The government becomes more careful, but also more
powerful. And the victim feels a little more secure, but effectively is without a
remedy against the press if the information reaches them by way of wrongful
disclosure.
VI. CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court has limited the alternatives for protection
from or remedy for the publication of sexual assault victims' identities by the media.
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in which this issue is heard agree that
sexual assault victims' privacy rights in this context are dramatically undercut.
Although not all rape confidentiality statutes have been found unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court is consistent in finding that a name connected with a crime is
legitimately a public matter, and that the press cannot be punished for publication
oftruthful, newsworthy information unless this right is countered by a state "interest
of the highest order." '85 The Court also indicated by its holding in FloridaStar that
not even physical protection of the individual victimized by a rape is a reason
86
sufficient enough to warrant punishment for publication of a victim's name.'
The most reliable way to protect a victim from unwanted publicity after an
assault is to follow the suggestion of the Supreme Court and enact legislation that
codifies procedures to prevent the information from getting into the hands of the
press. Pseudonyms, redacted names, and civil liability for officials who
"mishandle" confidential information are possible alternatives. Codification of
procedures for dealing with victims' identities, as well as providing for civil
remedies, would encourage more diligent maintenance of assault victim's identities.
This solution is not without problems, but the Supreme Court has indicated that it
would be a constitutionally acceptable alternative.
Kimberly Kelley Blackburn

185. FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 533.
186. Id. at 528, 541.
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